Author: Ji Changjin, Beijing No.2 Middle School History Club (Main Campus)
I. The Turks and Li Yuan
The year 617 of the Sui Dynasty (the 13th year of Emperor Yang’s reign) was a busy one. Various warlords rose in rebellion across China: Dou Jiande in Hebei, Xu Yuanlang in Shandong, Liang Shidu in Shuofang, Liu Wuzhou in Mayi, Xue Ju in Longyou, and Li Gui in Liangzhou. The vast Sui Dynasty quickly fragmented.
After the struggles between the Northern Qi and Northern Zhou, the Turks had come to an obvious conclusion: the chaos in Central China was beneficial to the Turks. Moreover, the rebellious warlords were also in urgent need of a strong backer to stabilize their forces. Thus, the Turks provided assistance to various factions. Liang Shidu and Liu Wuzhou were directly granted the title of Khan by the Turks, while Dou Jiande also had cordial exchanges with the Turks. Seizing the opportunity, the Turks began their southern advance. On May 17, tens of thousands of elite Turkish soldiers invaded Taiyuan, where our old acquaintance, Li Yuan, was stationed.
When Li Yuan saw the turmoil in the world, he naturally thought about rebellion. Yang Guang did not trust Li Yuan with guarding the frontier and had appointed his confidants Wang Wei and Gao Junya to supervise him. The Turkish invasion gave Li Yuan an opportunity. He used it as an excuse to falsely accuse Wang and Gao of colluding with the Turks, killed both of them, and set up a deceptive plan to scare the Turkish army away.
For the ambitious Li Yuan, the relationship with the Turks was obviously something he had to consider carefully. After the Turks withdrew, he immediately drafted a diplomatic letter of considerable sophistication. In it, he suggested a peaceful relationship with the Khan (if the Turks would follow him), promising that the wealth and women gained from future conquests would all go to the Khan. The letter began by claiming to be a righteous force and showed humility to the Turks, even touching upon their core interest of greed for wealth. However, the Turks were no longer the naïve youth they once were. Shibi Khan saw through Li Yuan’s intentions. In his reply, he first praised Li Yuan’s bravery, then criticized Yang Guang and encouraged Li Yuan to declare himself emperor.
Li Yuan was in a dilemma. His original plan was to support the Sui Dynasty to attract talented individuals while forming an alliance with the Turks to prevent any backstabbing. But now, the Turks wanted him to break from the Sui and serve them. He decided to put on a show.
Li Yuan received the response from the Turks, became furious, and declared that he would never cooperate with them, severing relations with the Turks. His advisors, Pei Ji and Liu Wenjing, persuaded him, but he rebuked them, stating that he had principles. In June, when his sons Li Shimin and Li Yuanji gathered their forces, Pei Ji once again suggested “abolishing the emperor and establishing the Prince of Dai, raising the righteous army to issue proclamations to the counties, and changing flags to show the Turks,” which would be a way of rebelling against Yang Guang but still maintaining allegiance to the Sui Dynasty. Only then did Li Yuan reluctantly agree.
II. The Rise of the Tang Dynasty
Since Li Yuan had “yielded” to the Turks, his journey to founding his empire became much smoother. With the Turks backing Liang Shidu and Liu Wuzhou, they were unwilling to invade the South, giving Li Yuan the chance to peacefully take control of Chang’an and establish the Prince of Dai.
However, as Li Yuan’s power grew and he gained momentum to unite the entire world, Shibi Khan found it increasingly difficult to adhere to his previous promises. From the time Li Yuan declared himself emperor to the ascension of Xieli Khan, the Turks had planned several military campaigns against the Tang, but they all failed for various reasons.
In April 618, Xue Ju, the ruler of the Western Qin, contacted the Turks and Liang Shidu, planning to attack Li Yuan. However, the governor of Wuyuan, Zhang Changxun, a double agent working for both the Tang and the Turks, got wind of the plan. He falsely sent an imperial edict from the Tang Dynasty to the Turks, pretending that Li Yuan was aware of the conspiracy. This delayed the Turkish advance. Shortly afterward, Li Yuan sent Yu Wenxin as an envoy to the Turks, resolving this crisis. Soon after, the Tang destroyed the Western Qin, and Xue Ju’s son, Xue Rengao, was executed (Xue Ju had already passed away from illness).
However, Li Yuan did not sever all ties with the Turks. When he proclaimed himself emperor in May, the Turks sent envoys to congratulate him, and Li Yuan still treated them with great respect. But by 619, when the military regime of Li Gui in Liangzhou was about to collapse, and the Tang Dynasty was on the verge of uniting the Central Plains, the Turks could no longer sit idly by and decided to intervene personally. Shibi Khan mustered his troops and marched toward Shuofang, but suddenly died, causing the invasion to fall through. His younger brother, Ashina Xichun, succeeded him and became Chuluo Khan. In 620, Chuluo Khan once again planned to invade the Tang, only to die unexpectedly before the war could even begin. The sudden death of two Khans in quick succession delayed the Turks’ offensive. If not for these deaths, the Tang Dynasty might have had to face a life-or-death struggle.
In 621, when the regimes of Dou Jiande and Wang Shichong were overthrown and the Tang Dynasty grew stronger, Li Yuan’s policy towards the Turks also began to change. Not only did the Tang and Turks start detaining envoys from each other, but in the 8th year of the Wude period (625), the format of their correspondence shifted from letters to imperial edicts. This marked the abandonment of the previous submissive policy toward the Turks. Over the years, border skirmishes between the Tang and the Turks increased.
For the Tang Dynasty, the challenges were not only from the Turks but also from internal factional struggles. When both issues overlapped, it triggered a pivotal moment in history—an event that would reveal the inevitable fate of both nations: the Agreement of the Wei River.
III. The Agreement of the Wei River
On June 4, 626, Li Shimin launched the Xuanwu Gate Incident, killed his older brother and younger brother and became the Emperor Taizong. The Turks quickly received the news from Liang Shidu. On August 9, Li Shimin declared himself emperor, and on August 19, Xieli Khan’s troops invaded Jingzhou. Within a day, they reached Wugong. By the 24th, they had advanced to the Gaoling area, just outside the capital. The capital was in a state of emergency. The historical accounts that followed provide two entirely different narratives.
In the official history, Emperor Taizong of the Tang is depicted as a valiant and invincible hero. The Turks sent an envoy, Zhi Shili, to extort money, and Taizong fiercely reprimanded him, even threatening to kill him. Eventually, Zhi Shili was temporarily imprisoned in the Tang imperial palace. Later, Taizong himself, along with six close confidants, went to the Wei River to negotiate with Xieli Khan, and somehow managed to scare off the Turkish army. On the 30th, Taizong and Xieli Khan made an oath on the banks of the Wei River, and the Turkish army withdrew.
This is the version found in the New and Old Tang Histories as well as the Zizhi Tongjian. However, a different historical source, the epitaph of Zhi Shili, tells a different story. According to this account, Zhi Shili’s mission to Chang’an was not to spy or display military power but to offer counsel to Taizong. In response, Taizong was not angry but actually overjoyed, and the two made a blood oath of friendship. So, which account is true?
The key to answering this question lies in the motives of the Turkish invasion. When the Turks approached the capital in 626, Li Jing was stationed in Lingzhou, Li Ji was in Bingzhou, and Qutu Tong was guarding Luoyang, leaving Chang’an relatively undefended. If the Turks had truly come with the intent of wiping out the Tang Dynasty, no matter how brave Emperor Taizong was at the Wei River, it likely would not have mattered much. Even if the Turks were wary of Li Jing’s potential return and retreat, they should have launched a large-scale attack first, and if the city could not be taken, they would decide what to do next. Yet, Taizong was able to scare off the Turkish army with only a single horse and some rhetoric, which seems somewhat implausible. Additionally, if Taizong were truly so brave, he would have seized the opportunity to demonstrate his military prowess on the battlefield, rather than conducting negotiations with Xieli Khan behind the scenes while leaving his army behind.
From this, we can conclude that the Turks did not intend to destroy the Tang but, as with all previous military actions, were likely only seeking to extort money and capture people. This conclusion is somewhat surprising, as both the Northern Wei and Mongol Empire rose from the steppes, pushing southward to claim control of the Central Plains. Why, then, would the Turks have so little ambition?
This question must be considered from a climatic perspective. When the Mongols rose to power, it was during a period of low global temperatures, which made the northern steppes less suitable for habitation. Naturally, the warlike nomads coveted the Central Plains, seeking to control more resources for survival. However, at the start of the Tang Dynasty, the world was in a warm period, and even the Tibetan Plateau supported powerful kingdoms like Tibet. The northern steppes must have been much more habitable, leaving the nomads with less pressure to abandon their homelands and conquer the unfamiliar lands of the Central Plains. Even with agitators like Liang Shidu, the Turkish rulers lacked the long-term vision and confidence to overthrow the Tang. Instead, they saw the Tang as a source of wealth, occasionally raiding for gold, silver, and slaves, and indulging in comfort on their home turf in the Mongolian Plateau.
With this clarity, we can return to a smaller historical perspective and see that Taizong of the Tang understood that the Turks were simply taking advantage of the chaos in the Tang to extract some wealth. Based on the information provided by the epitaph of Zhi Shili, this key intelligence may not have been Taizong’s own insight but rather a tip-off from Zhi Shili, who had already supported and been loyal to the Tang. Otherwise, it would be difficult to explain why Zhi Shili, who had nearly been killed, was later so highly regarded by Taizong. Therefore, the story in the New and Old Tang Histories about Taizong almost killing Zhi Shili is likely fictional, and it seems they were simply acting in concert.
Likewise, we can explain the negotiations at the Wei River. The reason Taizong only brought his confidants and negotiated with Xieli Khan was that he was not making threats about how strong the Tang was, but rather asking, “How much will it cost to make you leave?” From the outcome, it is clear that Xieli Khan was satisfied with the deal, and the Turkish army withdrew.
Looking at past history, the Turks did possess some political skill, but their strategic foresight was clearly limited. In contrast, from the time of Li Yuan’s reign, the Tang’s policy toward the Turks had already shifted toward seeking peace through warfare. When the more capable and ambitious Taizong took the throne, he grew resentful of his father’s previous appeasement, and under these circumstances, how long could he tolerate the Turks sleeping peacefully by his side?
IV. The Tang Emperor’s Victory Music
As we mentioned earlier, the climate at the beginning of the Zhenguan period was gradually warming, but with climate change often came frequent natural disasters. During the early years of the Tang Dynasty, the people experienced droughts, locust plagues, and frosts, causing significant hardship. However, “the emperor worked diligently to soothe the people, and although the people were reduced to begging for food, they did not complain.” Even though the situation seemed dire, it is evident that the disasters during the early years of the Zhenguan period did not lead to greater social unrest.
So, how did Emperor Taizong manage the state through a series of policies?
Firstly, he emphasized the “quietness” of governance, meaning not to overexert the people’s labor and to ensure the normal production and livelihood of the populace. To achieve this, he reduced taxes, changing the taxation system from household-based to land-based, considering the differences in wealth. He also cut down on unnecessary government officials, reducing the number of positions from more than 2,500 under the late Sui dynasty to just over 600. Moreover, Taizong attached great importance to water conservancy projects, with four major projects in the first year of Zhenguan alone, which improved the yields per acre. Additionally, he improved the storage system by setting up public granaries to stabilize grain prices. Taizong also valued population growth and not only implemented policies encouraging marriage and childbirth but also purchased a significant number of people from the Turks.
Natural disasters did not only affect the Tang dynasty; the Turks also suffered from severe cold waves, which greatly impacted their pastoral industry. What measures did the Turks take in response?
The answer is none. Qieli Khan even increased taxes on the various tribes of the steppe, leading to a rebellion by the Xueyantuo and the Uighur tribes. His nephew, Tuli Khan, was sent to quell the rebellion, but he failed. Infuriated, Qieli Khan humiliated Tuli by imprisoning and torturing him. Feeling that his position was no longer secure, Tuli Khan defected to the Tang dynasty. The Tang saw this as an opportunity and launched a diplomatic offensive. Tribes like Xueyantuo, Khitan, and Pugu all joined the Tang, and the treacherous Liang Shidu was destroyed in 628. The Eastern Turks were now isolated.
Qieli Khan, in a panic, decided to seek peace and submission with the Tang, but it was already too late.
In November of 629, Emperor Taizong, with Li Jing as the overall commander, led an army of 100,000 men on six fronts to eliminate the Eastern Turks. By this time, the Tang military had already established the Fubing system, with soldiers being mobilized from various localities. Despite the Turks’ reputation for bravery, the Tang army’s organized strength had surpassed that of the Turks. As Qieli Khan had already moved his camp to the southern Yin Mountains due to fears of the Xiongnu tribes’ rebellion, Li Jing launched a surprise attack with just 3,000 cavalry, forcing Qieli Khan to flee to the northern desert. Meanwhile, Li Ji, stationed at Baidao, had long been waiting. A decisive battle ensued, and Qieli Khan was defeated and forced to flee to the Iron Mountain. He sent an envoy to Emperor Taizong to beg for peace, but Li Jing and Li Ji did not give him a chance to regroup. They even launched an assault on Iron Mountain, with the vanguard led by the famous general Su Dingfang.
Qieli Khan, caught off guard, was forced to flee, and the Eastern Turks’ 100,000 strong army was captured by just 10,000 Tang soldiers. Qieli Khan tried to escape northward but was intercepted by Li Ji at Qikou. With no way out, he fled to the northwest of Lingzhou and sought refuge with his uncle, Sunish Khan. The governor of Lingzhou, Li Daozong, learned of this and forced Sunish Khan to hand over Qieli Khan. Reluctantly, Sunish Khan did so, and Qieli Khan was delivered to the Tang. The Eastern Turks were destroyed.
On the third day of the fourth month in the fourth year of Zhenguan (630), Emperor Taizong held a grand ceremony at the Shuntian Gate to receive Qieli Khan. He spared Qieli Khan’s life, and from then on, various tribes from the northern steppe continued to submit to the Tang. The history of the Turks came to an end.
(This passage was edited by UHHC Operations Office)
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